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# The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Strategy, and Communist Ties

An Intelligence Assessment

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The African National Congress
of South Africa:
Organization, Strategy,
and Communist Ties

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by of the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA,

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	The African National Congress of South Africa: Organization, Strategy, and Communist Ties	5X1
Key Judgments Information available as of 10 October 1983 was used in this report.	The African National Congress, the principal anti-South African insurgent group, has a long history of ties to the South African Communist Party (SACP). Pro-Soviet Communists, including some whites, today are well represented in the ANC's leadership and exert considerable influence, especially over military strategy. The ANC's heavy dependence on Soviet Bloc military aid is an important source of leverage for the SACP.	
25X1	In the last four years, the ANC military wing—operating primarily from bases outside South Africa—has conducted more than 110 attacks against economic and security targets and government administration facilities. Until the car bombing of South African Air Force Headquarters at Pretoria on 20 May 1983, which resulted in heavy civilian casualties, the ANC generally avoided inflicting casualties on civilians during its operations. In the near term, we judge that the ANC is unlikely to engage in indiscriminate terrorism but probably will strike government targets—especially security-related facilities and security personnel—more frequently than in the past. In addition, its efforts to avoid civilian casualties during some of its major operations probably will be less stringent, or—as in the car bombing incident—nonexistent.	25X1
25 <b>X</b> 1	The ANC is not a cohesive group. Both the Communists and non-Communist black veterans in the ANC leadership have restrained for years a large group of young, black, militant nationalists in the lower ranks, who resent the influential roles of Communists and whites in the organization and are eager to begin a terrorist campaign directed against white civilians. The leadership has refused to sanction such a campaign, but disgruntled black renegades in the ANC could initiate attacks against whites at any time. We believe, however, that the car bombing—which was directed against a military target but caused heavy casualties—may have been the result of an internal compromise between the militant and cautious factions and has helped to reduce tensions within the organization.	
	The ANC's military campaign is unlikely to pose a major threat to the white regime in the foreseeable future. South African security forces have numerous informers in the ANC and are able to thwart many of the group's operations in their early stages. Moreover, support from black African governments is vital to the ANC's ability to sustain a military campaign,	

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and Pretoria has used its military strength and economic leverage to coerce

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The African National Congress of South Africa:
Organization, Strategy,
and Communist Ties

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#### Introduction

The car bomb the African National Congress set off in front of South African Air Force Headquarters in Pretoria on 20 May 1983 represented a major departure from the group's policy of avoiding civilian casualties. The incident has raised new concerns about the strategy of the ANC and the extent of its ties with Communist regimes and organizations.

This paper assesses the scope and nature of the ANC's Communist ties and the internal tensions they have fostered, reviews ANC military operations in recent years, and discusses the implications of the group's probable future strategy on US interests in the area. Appendixes provide a detailed chronology of important events in the history of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), as well as a survey of prominent ANC and SACP personalities.

Longstanding Ties

There have been some South African Communists in the ANC during most of the last 60 years. The ANC was formed in 1912 as a black reformist group made up mainly of tribal chiefs and educated elite. The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which was founded in 1921 and joined the Comintern the same year, began recruiting black members and infiltrating black organizations in the mid-1920s after the government enacted a series of racially discriminatory laws. By 1928, 1,600 of the CPSA's 1,750 members were black, many of them members of the ANC.

The CPSA's initial success in gaining influence within the ANC came to an abrupt halt in 1930. After a visit to Moscow in 1927, ANC President Josiah Gumede triggered a conservative backlash within the organization by advocating a program of civil disobedience. Gumede was replaced in 1930, and the ANC resumed its slow-moving reformist campaign. At the same time, internal dissension over political strategy and a

purge of socialists by pro-Moscow radicals almost caused the demise of the CPSA; its membership dropped from 3,000 in 1929 to 150 in 1931, and the party was moribund for more than a decade.

The CPSA experienced a revival in the 1940s, when some of its members rose to prominent positions in other organizations. J. B. Marks, a Colored CPSA member in the ANC hierarchy and president of the African Mine Workers' Union, led a strike by 74,000 black miners in 1946. Strong efforts by Marks and other CPSA members on behalf of blacks tightened the links between the ANC and the CPSA and gained the latter new recruits.

Following the outlawing of the CPSA in 1950, black Communists who had not previously done so joined the ANC, while Communists of other races infiltrated existing labor and opposition groups and established new front organizations. Former CPSA members secretly reorganized the party in 1953 and renamed it the South African Communist Party (SACP). They also achieved domination over the Congress of Democrats (COD)—a parallel, legal organization of some 400 leftist whites—that had been formed a year earlier. The SACP and the COD gained control over a coalition of ethnically based groups—including the ANC—known as the Congress Alliance, by taking over joint working committees.

A major split in the ANC in the late 1950s reflected in part the growing influence of the Communists within the organization. Blacks with militant and nationalist attitudes broke with the ANC and formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1958-59. The PAC argued that non-African—especially white Communist—domination of the Congress Alliance was reinforcing black African servitude.

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The South African Government banned both the ANC and the PAC shortly after the Sharpeville incident of 1960. Forced underground, the ANC lost	The ANC attempted to attract greater levels of external support in the early 1970s, but was largely unsuccessful until the Soweto riots in 1976. Thou-	25 <b>X</b> 1
its ability to raise funds inside South Africa and began to turn more directly to the SACP. A former SACP official claimed the SACP responded immedi-	sands of young blacks fled South Africa in the wake of the riots and joined the ANC. Moscow, probably believing that the riots signaled an extended phase of	25X1
ately with financial assistance.	violent unrest in South Africa, increased its military aid to the ANC.	25 <b>X</b> 1 <sub>.</sub>
Few details are available on the		25 <b>X</b> 1·
value or kind of assistance provided by the Soviets, but we believe it was mainly financial, although some small arms probably were provided as well. In any event, we believe the aid came at a critical time for the ANC and was instrumental in twing the ANC to	In March 1977, Soviet President Podgorny met with ANC Acting President Tambo in Zambia and pledged increased military training and arms to the ANC. Six months later, Tambo traveled to Havana	25 <b>X</b> 1
the ANC and was instrumental in tying the ANC to the SACP.	where he obtained a Cuban agreement to provide training for ANC military personnel in Angola and Cuba.	
A high command—comprised of leading ANC and SACP members—directed the military wing, which launched a campaign of sabotage bombings in 1961.	Bolstered by the new aid and recruits, the ANC strengthened its infrastructure in southern Africa and	25 <b>X</b> 1
Police terminated the short-lived campaign with a series of arrests of ANC and SACP leaders in 1963-65. Those members of the ANC and SACP hierar-	in the late 1970s conducted a small number of sabotage bombings and haphazard attacks on police stations. In 1980, it launched a more earnest and	25X1
chies who escaped the dragnet went into exile to rebuild their organizations. The SACP was able to	organized campaign that has continued to the present.	25X1
expand its influence on the ANC during this period largely because the SACP had more international contacts than the ANC and was more experienced in	Present Dynamics of ANC-SACP Relations	25X1
operating underground. In 1966, a Congress Consultative Committee was established in London to coor-	Today, the ANC and the SACP maintain separate	25X1
dinate activities within the Congress Alliance.	organizational structures. This helps to play down the image of a Communist and Soviet-controlled ANC,	25 <b>X</b> 1
In turn, most ANC leaders were Communists by	but the two organizations openly describe their relationship as an "alliance."	25 <b>X</b> 1
The ANC officially opened its membership to	Connecting Links The SACP is a pro-Soviet, semisecret party based in	25 <b>X</b> 1
nonblacks in 1969, but influential white Communists who joined apparently chose initially to maintain low profiles and work through black SACP members in	London which remains well represented in the ANC's leadership.	25X1
the ANC hierarchy.		25 <b>X</b> 1
Police opened fire on a crowd of blacks in Sharpeville during a		25X1
demonstration sponsored by the PAC to protest legislation aimed at controlling the movement of blacks.		

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	with Communists but do not fully embrace Marxism-
	with Communists but do not fully embrace Marxism-Leninism, especially its doctrine of atheism.
The SACP—which claims that 90 percent of its members are blacks—is solidly entrenched in the ranks of the ANC	Leninism, especially its doctrine of atheism.

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anila II-lian, but lists only moderate cocialist aims	
oviet Union, but lists only moderate socialist aims or the ANC rather than strictly adhering to a	
Marxist-Leninist line. <sup>2</sup>	•
Since its inception, the ANC has avoided officially adopting a	
pecific ideology, presumably to broaden its internal and interna-	
pecific ideology, presumably to broaden its internal and interna-	

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#### Oliver Tambo



Liaison @

Tambo, 66, is a 40-year veteran of the ANC who since 1967 has ruled in the shadow of imprisoned and legendary ANC President Nelson Mandela. Tambo is reportedly a non-Communist, but black nationalists within the ANC emphasize his close ties with the SACP. In our view, Tambo is a realist who acts in accordance with the ANC's dependence on Communist sources of aid, but who sometimes resents having his authority undercut by Communists. He heads the ANC's National Executive Committee and is also a member of the World Peace Council. He resides in Lusaka, Zambia, but travels frequently

Lusaka, Zambia, but travels frequently.

Lusaka in travels frequently.

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#### Strategy

#### An Armed Propaganda Campaign

ANC operations in the last four years generally have conformed to a set pattern. The categories of targets, their locations, and the timing and methods involved in these attacks strongly suggest that political and propaganda objectives dominate ANC operational planning. The ANC leadership, in our view, realizes that its organization is not yet capable of conducting a viable insurgency. It carries out operations primarily to attract greater support among South African blacks and to focus international attention on their grievances.

Since 1980, the ANC has conducted some 112 attacks against energy and transportation targets, government buildings, and security personnel and facilities. Most of the government buildings bombed were involved in some aspect of black administration, especially the system of pass laws designed to restrict the movement of blacks in the country. Many of the attacks on transportation facilities were aimed at disrupting the flow of workers from the black townships to white urban centers. Almost all of the attacks on police stations occurred in the homelands or black townships. These operations were designed to intimidate black security personnel, whom the ANC accuses of being apartheid collaborators.

The majority of operations have been conducted in the most populated urban areas. Of the 78 attacks carried out by the ANC in 1981-82, 51 occurred in the cities of Johannesburg, Durban, East London, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and their adjoining townships. The remainder were scattered throughout more isolated areas of South Africa and in the black homelands.

Some 60 of the incidents during 1981 and 1982 were bombings and about 85 percent of these occurred at night, primarily in unoccupied buildings or on isolated railways. Daylight bombings, on the other hand, often occurred only minutes before a crowd was expected or after a train had passed. The pattern of these close calls suggests that they were intentional and designed to increase media coverage.

The ANC chose most of the dates for its attacks to enhance their political impact. In 1981 and 1982, twothirds of the operations were conducted just prior to or on an ANC historical anniversary or a white holiday, or in response to events in South Africa with political implications for blacks:

- Twenty-five incidents occurred in the months of May and June. Important dates in these months include: 31 May—Republic Day (anniversary of the founding of the Republic of South Africa); 16 June—anniversary of the Soweto riots; 26 June—anniversary of the establishment of the ANC's Freedom Charter (the ANC's political manifesto).
- Seven operations were conducted on 25 May 1981—the highest number of ANC operations on a single day. The ANC had called for a work boycott on that date to counter white celebrations planned for the 20th Anniversary of the Republic on 31 May.

Most ANC attacks are carried out by personnel based outside of South Africa who infiltrate from Mozambique via Swaziland,

ANC teams normally are involved in the operations: the first identifies targets and provides information on them; the second caches arms and explosives it has smuggled into South Africa; the third carries out the approved mission and usually exfiltrates immediately afterward.

Other evidence suggests that some ANC operational teams remain within the black townships and possibly within the homelands for months at a time. A press report in January 1982 stated that South African police had found an underground ANC facility north of Pretoria containing weapons, explosives, food, medicines, and other supplies. Moreover, a steady stream of ANC bombings in Durban in 1981 ended in December of that year following the arrests of a group of suspected ANC guerrillas in Durban. The group was implicated in seven Durban bombings that occurred over a nine-month period in 1981. The round-up was followed by a five-month hiatus on bombings in the Durban area.

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
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Figure 2 African National Congress (ANC) Attacks, 1981 Through 10 October 1983



#### Key Dates on the ANC Calendar

The ANC in the last four years has conducted numerous operations, including some "spectaculars," near or on the following dates:

8 January	Anniversary of the formation of the ANC in 1912.
21 March	Anniversary of the Sharpeville incident in 1960.
6 April	Solomon Mahlangu Day. Commemorates the death by hanging in 1979 of an ANC guerrilla arrested in South Africa for participation in an incident that resulted in two white fatalities.
31 May	Republic Day. Anniversary of the founding of the Republic of South Africa in 1961. The ANC resents that blacks were not allowed to participate in the political processes, such as the national referendum, that resulted in the founding of the Republic.
16 June	Anniversary of the outbreak of the Soweto riots in 1976.
26 June	Anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter—the political manifesto of the ANC—in 1955.
30 July	Anniversary of the establishment of the Communist Party in South Africa in 1921.
12 September	Anniversary of the death in detention in 1977 of South African black activist Steve Biko.
26 October	Anniversary of the Transkei's independence in 1976. Three other homelands have accepted "independence" since 1976, but none have been recognized by any government other than South Africa. The ANC has labeled the leaders of the independent homelands as "collaborators who have furthered the grand apartheid scheme of the white regime."
16 December	Heroes' Day; anniversary of the creation of the ANC's military wing—"Umkhonto we Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation)—in 1961. The date coincides with the Afrikaner holiday, the "Day of the Covenant," the anniversary of the Battle of Blood River in 1838 in which a greatly outnumbered group of Afrikaner

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
"trekkers" defeated Zulu warriors.

The following attacks by the ANC gained extensive media coverage:	
1 June 1980  Bombs explode at two synthetic oil plants and a large oil refinery in the Transvaal resulting in \$8 million in damages and lost oil.	25X1
12 August 1981  Six 122-mm rockets are fired at Voortrekkerhoogte military base near Pretoria.  Most miss the target or do not explode. There is little damage and only one black civilian is injured. The incident marks the first ANC attack on a South African Defense Force facility.	25X1
Bomb explodes underneath a train carrying 350 passengers—mostly blacks—in the eastern Transvaal, just before a river crossing. Major disaster is averted as train does not derail. An ANC attorney claims that the operational team used an outdated timetable and was horrified when a passenger train—instead of an expected freight train—detonated the bomb.	25 <b>X</b> 1
18-19 December 1982 Four bombs explode over a 12-hour period at the Koeberg nuclear power plant near Cape Town. Attack occurs less than a week before scheduled fuel loading. Damage is extensive and plant opening is delayed for about nine months, in our view, with full commercial operation not expected until mid-1984.	25 <b>X</b> 1
18 February 1983  Bombing of Bantu Administration Board building in Bloemfontein kills one and injures some 75 others, all blacks.	25 <b>X</b> 1
20 May 1983 Car bomb detonates during rush hour in downtown Pretoria in front of South African Air Force Headquarters. Some 200 are injured and 19 killed; more than	25X1
half of the casualties are civilians.	25 <b>X</b> 1
We believe that the ANC's armed propaganda campaign reflected the leadership's concern that the organization might not survive a series of determined South African counterattacks against ANC personnel in neighboring countries. The low rate of casualties in	
1981 and 1982 supported the ANC's claims at the SACP and the ANC.  SACP and the ANC.	25X1 ,
Debate Over Tactics  Debate Over Tactics  The growing tension within the ANC between SACP members and black nationalist factions has been reflected most strongly in clashes over military tactics. The Communists reportedly have joined with	
Two of the deaths were by assassination—a former ANC member, who was labeled a traitor, and his wife. A third victim who died in a bombing may have been the ANC member planting the device.  25X	1

	ing young black nationalists from engaging in random terrorism against white civilians.	nel, and that some civilians may be unavoidably harmed during these attacks.
25 <b>X</b> 1		Although the ANC has inflicted only a few apparently unintentional injuries in 11 operations conducted since the car bombing, we judge that at least one of these operations was designed to kill security personnel. The ANC blew up 10 oil tanks near a small resort town north of Pretoria on 10 October. Police subse-
	The car bombing by the ANC on 20 May 1983 in downtown Pretoria was a major departure from the group's policy of avoiding civilian casualties. The car bomb—designed to inflict casualties rather than damage buildings—was detonated during rush hour out-	quently found two explosive devices—set to detonate one hour after the oil tanks exploded—at a nearby civil defense headquarters. A Cabinet official publicly accused the ANC of planting the devices to kill security officials who met at the headquarters after the oil tank blasts to assess the damage and do emergency planning.
	side of Air Force Headquarters. More than half of the	20/(1
	217 injured and 19 killed were civilians, many of them whites.  The incident may have been the result of an internal	Growing Popularity The ANC is the most popular opposition group among 25X1 blacks in South Africa, and support for the group is on the rise, according to polls by academic researchers
	compromise. The South African raid on Maseru, Lesotho, last December, in which about 30 ANC	and the press. Surveys conducted in 1982 indicated that 40 percent of urban blacks support the ANC and
	personnel were killed, could have prompted such a departure from previous policy.	would vote for ANC candidates for Parliament if blacks and the ANC were allowed to participate in elections. The majority of blacks consistently choose Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned ANC President, as the most widely recognized and important black leader. During the past year, the ANC's colors, flag, and songs were evident at numerous demonstrations and at funerals for deceased white and black activists, some of whom were known ANC members.
	We believe that the Communists and veterans in the ANC's leadership may have viewed the Maseru raid as the last straw and subsequently yielded to the black	According to polls, the ANC's growth in popularity can be attributed to its military campaign, and growing anger and militancy among urban blacks. In January 1982, a close adviser to Chief Buthelezi, leader of the Zuly based Inheaths movement, admitted
25 <b>X</b> 1	militants' longstanding demand for greater violence, but without sanctioning indiscriminate terrorism.	leader of the Zulu-based Inkatha movement, admitted that his ANC rivals had made massive gains in developing grass-roots support in Natal Province. He attributed the gains to the numerous attacks—some 17—by the ANC in Natal in 1981 and added that
25 <b>X</b> 1	Tambo has indicated in press statements, however, that the ANC	blacks generally were elated by the attacks. Most blacks interviewed by the press after the car bombing in downtown Pretoria expressed approval of the act.  They generally shared the view that the white regime
		25X1

had forced the ANC to resort to more violent tactics		25X1
by conducting cross-border attacks and by refusing to share political power with blacks.		25 <b>X</b> 1
Focusing on Black Unions The ANC, in our view, has had little success in transforming its popularity into active support. The		
US Embassy reports that, although there probably is an ANC network within South Africa, most of its components are likely to have atrophied due to inac-	On balance, however, we believe that neither the ANC nor the SACP has had any substantial success so far in achieving direct influence in the black trade	•
tivity and an inability to communicate frequently with the external command.	unions. Union leaders, for their part, are highly sensitive to the dangers that explicit connections of this sort would pose to the survival of individual	25X1 `
We believe that ANC and SACP leaders alike fully recognize that the military wing of the ANC is a long way from posing a real threat to white control of	unions.	25 <b>X</b> 1
South Africa. Both organizations have shown remarkable resilience, patience, and determination to stay	Impediments to the Military Campaign	
with a long campaign. As the two look for other ways to promote their goals, they seem to have focused increasingly on the growing black labor movement in South Africa.	Regional Constraints  South Africa in recent years has used its dominant military strength and economic leverage to pressure	25 <b>X</b> 1
We believe that the Soviets also have doubts about the long-term prospects of the ANC's military campaign because of Pretoria's capable security apparatus. In	its neighbors to crack down on the ANC. The ANC operates today under growing constraints as a result of its deteriorating relations with several key states that have been targets of South African pressure	25X1
our view, they see more potential in using the ANC's appeal among blacks to gain control of the black labor	tactics. Angola is the only state in the region that presently allows a permanent, large-scale ANC military presence; the group has military headquarters	25X1
movement.	and several training camps in northern Angola.	25X1
ANC Acting President Tambo told the press in June 1983 that political action, notably among the half million black members of the trade unions, is the	Botswana. Botswana has actively discouraged the ANC from using its territory to stage operations against South Africa.	25X1 25X1
ANC's first priority.	aganist South Africa.	25X1
Several of the more militant unions have openly endorsed the ANC's political aims.		25X1 .
The main vehicle for SACP entry into the black labor	Despite numerous arrests in Botswana of armed ANC members, the group still has been able to mount some	25X1
movement is the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), based in Lusaka, Zambia. Founded in 1954, SACTU today operates in self-imposed exile	covert operations from there. As a result, Pretoria is skeptical about Gaborone's official policy that prohibits the ANC in Botswana from bearing arms and	25 <b>X</b> 1
and acts, in our view, as the labor arm of the SACP. The president of SACTU, Stephen Dlamini, is an SACP member, and SACP literature in recent years has vigorously promoted SACTU as a key organiza-		25X1
tion in the black labor movement.		25 <b>X</b> 1

Figure 3 African National Congress in Southern Africa



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using facilities and personnel to stage operations against South Africa. The US Embassy reported that, at a meeting in Johannesburg in April, the South African Foreign Minister gave his Botswana counterpart a list of 38 ANC activists operating in Botswana and claimed that the Soviet Embassy there had regular contact with some of these ANC members. We believe Gaborone is likely to impose further restrictions on the ANC in Botswana.	most ANC operations—and other Mozambican towns near the South African border. A reliable source told the US Embassy in August that the Machel government generally keeps a tight rein on ANC personnel in Mozambique and does not provide military training for the group. The same source reported, however, that Mozambique has not made a determined effort to prevent the ANC from using Mozambique to infiltrate South Africa.	25X1
Lesotho. Until recently, Lesotho turned a blind eye toward ANC activities. In August, however, Lesotho announced that, in compliance with Pretoria's demand, it planned to expel South African refugees connected with the ANC and other groups banned in South Africa.* The announcement followed South	The restrained response of the Machel government to the airstrike South Africa conducted against alleged ANC facilities near Maputo three days after the car bombing in Pretoria 9 does not augur well for the ANC. The Mozambican Foreign Minister told a US diplomet in August that the circuits had checked and	25 <b>X</b> 1
African moves in the wake of the car bombing in Pretoria to institute strict border controls and to refuse to release foreign arms shipments seized several	diplomat in August that the airstrike had shocked and angered Mozambique, but had not altered his government's desire for more normal relations with Pretoria.	25X1
months earlier while en route to Maseru.		25 <b>X</b> 1
The ANC's recruitment and operational activities in Lesotho are likely to be reduced greatly if the government carries out the expulsion. Nonetheless, the group		
probably will be able to regain a small clandestine		
presence in Lesotho because of that country's limited security resources.		25X1
	Swaziland. With a healthy respect for the wrath of its	20, ( )
Mozambique. Pretoria's two cross-border operations	larger neighbor, Swaziland has cracked down on the	
against the ANC in Mozambique in the last two	ANC presence in the country. In the last two years,	
years—combined with South African support for Mozambican insurgents—probably have weakened	Swazi police have worked vigorously to apprehend	
Maputo's traditionally firm ties with the ANC. Mo-	ANC guerrillas transiting Swaziland. ANC members convicted in Swaziland of possessing arms or planning	
zambique eventually may reach an agreement with	terrorist operations against South Africa are fined	
Pretoria that works against the ANC.	and deported to Mozambique.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Because of the ANC's threatened position within		25 <b>X</b> 1
other states bordering South Africa, continued access		25 <b>X</b> 1
to Mozambican territory is critical if the ANC is to		
maintain a military campaign.		25 <b>X</b> 1
the group pres-	South African security officials report that Swaziland	25X1
ently has transit facilities in and around Maputo—	is still the main infiltration route for ANC guerrillas	20/(1
which remains the planning and staging center for	traveling from Maputo to South Africa. Pretoria,	25 <b>X</b> 1
Pretoria in mid-August presented Lesotho with a list of 68 refugees allegedly associated with the ANC whom Pretoria wanted expelled. Lesotho claimed it would not single out the ANC but would expel all refugees connected with groups banned in South	<sup>o</sup> According to the Mozambique Government, five Mozambican civilians were killed and 30 injured in the raid.	
Africa to preempt future demands by Pretoria.	25X1	

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	however, has praised Swazi security officials for trying to stop the ANC from using Swaziland as a	25X1
	springboard for attacks against South Africa.	25X1
	Tanzania.	25X1 25X1
	Tanzania also allows hundreds of ANC recruits to receive nonmilitary training at the ANC-run Solomon Mahlangu College at Morogoro. In addition, the ANC operates a large refugee camp near Morogoro.	
		25X1
	Zambia. The ANC has its political headquarters in Lusaka, but the Zambian Government closely monitors the group's military personnel.	25X1
	In mid-1982, the Zambian Government moved ANC military personnel in	We believe that the Mugabe government will continue to employ measures aimed at restraining the ANC in Zimbabwe, and that the ANC eventually may wear
	Lusaka to two small camps on the outskirts of the city, according to the US Embassy. The government	out its welcome in Zimbabwe. Following the two aborted ANC missions staged from Zimbabwe this
	relocated the guerrillas to protect urban civilians in the event of a South African attack against the ANC.	year, some Zimbabwean officials speculated that the 25X1  ANC may be deliberately trying to spark a confronta-
	the event of a South African attack against the Afric.	tion between Pretoria and Harare. 25X1
25X1	Pretoria has long threatened to take action against the ANC in Zambia. After the car bombing in Pretoria, Zambia—and other states in southern Africa—braced for a South African attack.	25X1
25 <b>X</b> 1		
	Zimbabwe. To avoid provoking Pretoria, the Mugabe government has not allowed ANC members in Zimbabwe to carry weapons or use Zimbabwe to infiltrate South Africa; the group, however, has been newly active in Zimbabwe.	
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		23/1
Outlook  The ANC and the SACP will almost certainly continue their symbiotic relationship if only because the alliance facilitates the ANC's access to Soviet Bloc assistance.	The long-term impact on the ANC of the large influx of black militants that followed the Soweto riots is uncertain. Many from the "Class of '76" eventually may replace the aging black moderates in the ANC leadership. The disdain many black militants show for the SACP, however, may reduce their chances of moving upward within the ANC, especially in view of the extensive influence of Communists within the ANC hierarchy. Moreover, as the young militants gain more experience, their views on tactics may be tempered by an appreciation of the capabilities of the	25X1 25X1
We expect non-Communist ANC leaders, however, to continue to seek alternative sources of military aid to offset the influence of the pro-Soviet faction. The SACP, for its part, recognizes the value of its ties to the ANC—the most popular opposition group among South African blacks—and is unlikely to end the relationship.	South African security forces. These factors may result in a new generation of leaders who pursue a campaign similar to the one now in progress. Nonetheless, it is equally as likely that the ANC—or a militant faction within the ANC—under the influence of a more youthful and antiwhite leadership will pursue a more violent campaign, despite the overwhelming hazards involved	25X1 25X1
We believe that, in the short term, the ANC will increase its attacks against state targets, primarily security-related facilities in urban areas. The total number of casualties in the next year—especially among white security personnel—probably will exceed previous annual rates, but we expect the majority of ANC operations in 1984 to return to the familiar pattern of past years. We believe that the ANC's efforts to avoid civilian casualties during some major attacks will be less stringent in the future, or—as in the car bombing incident—nonexistent. Black mili-	We believe the ANC will continue to enjoy wide-spread and increasing popular support, especially if Pretoria allows internal groups informally associated with the ANC to expand their activities and memberships. The largest of these was formed this year: the United Democratic Front—made up of some 400 mostly nonwhite religious, sports, student, labor, and civic groups. It claims to have a membership of 1 million, which would make it the largest opposition group in South Africa.	25 <b>X</b> 1
tants dissatisfied with the leadership's cautious strategy could begin at any time a renegade campaign of killing white civilians.	Although established primarily to oppose Prime Minister Botha's constitutional reform proposals which would grant limited political rights to Coloreds and Indians, the Front, in our view, probably will address a wider range of issues as its membership grows. The Front already has taken the lead in a new campaign to gain Nelson Mandela's release from prison. The leadership of the Front is composed largely of blacks with strong connections to the ANC, according to the	25X1 25X1

US Embassy. Many groups in the Front are known to give allegiance to the ANC and its multiracial, mildly socialist, political manifesto—the Freedom Charter. 25X1 Implications for the United States The ANC increasingly has directed its propaganda attacks against the United States and its policy of constructive engagement with Pretoria. Because of the group's popularity among South African blacks, these attacks could damage US relations with South 25X1 Africa's black community in the long term After the car bombing in Pretoria, Tambo publicly warned foreign firms in South Africa that the ANC might attack them. Referring to independent security measures taken by many of these firms, Tambo said that "foreign firms have become militarized" and "foreign capital is now part of South Africa's military might." We believe that the ANC may initiate attacks against foreign businesses in the next few years in an attempt to drive away foreign capital and further isolate the white regime. 25X1 The cycle of ANC attacks and South African "preemptive" and retaliatory raids already has complicated US efforts to encourage a normalization of South Africa's relations with other states in the region. If the ANC launches a bloodier campaign, the likely South African response probably would be a setback for US-sponsored peace initiatives in the region. 25X1 Although the ANC appears incapable of mounting a regime-threatening military campaign in the near future, the group's operations could affect the rate of political reform in South Africa. We believe that greater numbers of casualties, for example, would only steel opposition among whites, especially Afrikaners, to reforms that would fundamentally alter the apartheid system. 25X1

#### Appendix A

# A Chronology of Ties Between the ANC and the South African Communist Party

South African Native National Congress is established and later renamed the 1912 African National Congress. Leftists split with South African Labor Party and form International Socialist 1915 League (ISL). 1921 ISL members, many of whom had a special interest in the black labor movement, and other leftists form the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The CPSA joins the Comintern and complies with Soviet orders to concentrate on gaining control of white trade unions. 1922 Mine owners, trying to offset declining gold prices, precipitate a violent strike by announcing plans to lay off more highly paid white employees and replace them with blacks. The CPSA initially supports the miners' campaign, over which it has little direct control, but becomes disaffected after white miners attack black workers who remain on the job. 1924 Pact by the Labor and Nationalist Parties gains them an electoral victory. New government enacts a series of discriminatory laws, some of which entrench white labor privilege. CPSA subsequently shifts its attention to recruiting black members and infiltrating black organizations. Main target is the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU). Begun as a trade union of black dock workers in 1919, the ICU grows in the 1920s and becomes a mass political movement with well over 100,000 members, eclipsing the ANC during this period. CPSA's four members on the ICU's National Executive Committee lead the left 1926 wing of the ICU in calls for a more militant program. The remainder of the ICU leadership responds by expelling all CPSA members from the ICU. CPSA focuses on the ANC as a result. 1927 ANC President Josiah Gumede attends the Brussels Conference of the League against Imperialism and visits the USSR. Upon his return, he unsuccessfully lobbies for a new ANC strategy of demonstrations, strikes, tax boycotts, pass burnings, and close ties with the Soviets. 1928 New directive from Comintern states that, in response to the "united white front arrayed against the nonwhites," the CPSA must work toward establishing "an independent Native Republic-with full guarantees for minority groups-as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' government." Many in the CPSA (especially former ISL members) object to the Soviet line because they prefer to regard blacks as an "exploited class of workers" rather than as a "persecuted race." A pro-Moscow group of ultraleftists, however, eventually gains control and purges the CPSA of black members and whites with ties to trade unions. The purge is sparked by a Comintern directive which accuses all socialists of not being "true revolutionaries."

1930s	CPSA is virtually moribund despite abandonment of its ultraleft line; ANC continues to follow a slow-moving reformist campaign after Gumede loses reelection bid in 1930.
1941	CPSA membership increases after Hitler invades the Soviet Union. Black Communists gain new footholds in the ANC.
1944	A group of young black nationalists—disgusted with the lack of progress resulting from the ANC's moderate tactics—form the ANC Youth League. Most Youth Leaguers are initially anti-Communist and believe that there is no role for whites in the struggle for black rights.
1946	J. B. Marks, a Colored Communist in the ANC, leads a major strike by the African Mineworkers' Union.
1948	Afrikaner-based National Party comes to power.
1949	Youth Leaguers dominate ANC National Conference and push through a new "Program of Action" that calls for civil disobedience, strikes, and boycotts.
1950	Suppression of Communism Act bans the CPSA and also gives the government wide powers to counter extraparliamentary opposition groups. CPSA announces its dissolution one month prior to passage of the act. Portions of the organization continue to operate underground; three years later the South African Communist Party (SACP) is formed.
1952	The ANC and the Communist-led South African Indian Congress (SAIC) join in a Defiance Campaign of passive resistance, which reflects the growing influence of Communists and Youth Leaguers in the ANC. Defiance Campaign is aimed at changing six "unjust" laws, including the Suppression of Communism Act.
1952-55	Congress Alliance is formed between the ANC, the South African Colored Peoples Organization, the SAIC, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. A Congress of the People is held in 1955 and a Freedom Charter is adopted that lists the basic aims of the movement. Later that year, the government arrests 156 Congress Alliance leaders on treason charges. The defendants eventually gain acquittals, but the six-year trial consumes the energy of the Congress Alliance, which loses its momentum.
1958-59	Black nationalists, angered by the influence of white Communists on the ANC, split with the ANC and form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).
1960	The government bans both the ANC and the PAC after the Sharpeville incident.
1961	The ANC forms a military wing—Spear of the Nation—and launches a campaign of sabotage bombings.
1962	The SACP draws up a new Party Program and adopts as short-term objectives the goals listed in the Congress Alliance's Freedom Charter.

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1963-65	A series of mass arrests cripples the ANC and weakens the SACP. Among those captured and sentenced to life imprisonment are ANC President Nelson Mandela and SACP Chairman Bram Fischer. ANC and SACP leaders who escape the dragnet go into exile to rebuild their organizations.	
1969	ANC opens its membership to nonblacks at a conference in Morogoro, Tanzania.	
1976	ANC recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing South Africa in the wake of the Soweto riots and trains them for service in the military wing.	
1980-83	The reinvigorated military wing of the ANC renews its "armed propaganda" campaign by attacking government buildings, and security personnel and facilities, and by sabotaging power and transportation equipment and facilities.	
		25 <b>X</b> 1

